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This paper assesses empirically the hypotheses by Bental and Demougin (2010)
that innovations in ICT (Information and Communication Technology) reduce the
labor share in OECD countries by improving the monitoring technology. In a first
step, I show that data trends for the labor share, wages in efficiency units, and
labor in efficiency units over capital can be matched by a simulation of the model
of Bental and Demougin (2010). In a second approach, I confirm increasing moni-
toring of workers using micro data for Germany. I argue that ICT influences labor
not only through substitutability of labor with ICT and foreign work, but also
through to lowering rents of workers as monitoring technology improves.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s the income share of labor has decreased in many OECD countries. A common
hypothesis for this decrease is capital augmenting technical change. Technological change,
especially due to innovations in information and communication technology (ICT), is often
assumed to be labor saving at least for specific skill groups. The labor saving aspect originates
from a substitutability of ICT with labor. Bental and Demougin (2010) propose another
channel through which ICT affects the labor share. In their model, ICT innovations enable
more efficient monitoring of workers. With higher monitoring precision, the workers’ rents
can be reduced at every level of effort, which consequently lowers the labor share. The aim of
this paper is to assess the model and the resulting hypotheses of Bental and Demougin (2010)
against real world data.
Bental and Demougin (2010) explain the decreasing labor share by an institutional model
where the downward movements the labor share, wages relative to productivity and effective
labor relative to capital, are caused by an improvement in monitoring technology. The model
is a partial equilibrium where a representative worker and a firm bargain over wage contracts.
Since the worker’s effort is not contractible, the firm offers him an incentive contract. The
worker exerts more effort if he has a higher bargaining power and therefore receives a higher
share of the profits. If the worker can be monitored, the need for incentives to induce effort is
reduced. Consequently, as monitoring tightens, a given effort level can be achieved by lower
bargaining power. Before bargaining takes place the firm has to invest into capital, which is
the other input into production. As capital investments are made before wage bargaining, the
firm faces a problem of irreversible investment. With a higher bargaining power for the firm,
investment decisions are more efficient. If the bargaining power of the worker is reduced due
to increased monitoring, the investment problem becomes less severe as the firm receives a
higher share of the quasi-rents.
Bental and Demougin (2010) argue that the monitoring technology has steadily improved
since 1980. It therefore takes less and less bargaining power to induce effort. The lower
bargaining power relaxes the hold-up problem and investment into capital becomes more
profitable. As a result, the labor share as well as wages decrease relative to productivity. As
capital investments are more efficient, more capital is used in production relative to effective
labor.
The falling labor share phenomenon is well known and has encouraged much research.
Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003), the European Commission (2007), and Checchi and Garcia-
Penalosa (2010) find changes in labor market institutions, such as bargaining coordination,
minimum wages, or unemployment benefits, to be influencing the labor share. Another set of
studies focuses on the impact of globalization on the labor share. Harrison (2002), Guscina
(2007), Jaumotte and Tytell (2008), and Jayadev (2007) show for different indicators for
economic openness, that higher economic integration lowers the labor share in developed
countries. Arpaia et al. (2009) argue that capital-augementing technological progress which is
low-skilled labor saving, is a main force in reducing the labor share in Europe. The European
Commission (2007) confirms a substitutability of low-skilled labor and capital, but find an
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overall positive correlation between labor and capital, similar to Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa
(2010). The European Commission (2007) include ICT use in their analysis. Low-skilled work
seems also substitutable to ICT, while the overall impact on the is insignificant. Schneider
(2011) combines the analyses of economic integration and ICT innovations on the labor share.
The study shows that there is a combined impact of ICT innovations and economic integration
on the labor share.
Similar to the studies described above, the model by Bental and Demougin (2010) includes
changes in labor market institutions and ICT innovations as causes for the decrease in the
labor share. The causal relationship is nevertheless different. While bargaining power is
exogenous in other studies, it is endogenous in the model by Bental and Demougin (2010) and
reacts to improvements in monitoring technology. Furthermore, ICT does not decrease wages,
because the price of labor has to fall as its substitute, ICT, becomes cheaper, but because ICT
reduces the information rents of the workers due to improvements in monitoring technology.
I assess the hypotheses of Bental and Demougin (2010) empirically in two approaches. First,
I simulate the model on a macro level for various countries. Then I analyze evidence of
increasing monitoring intensity of workers on the micro level.
For the simulation of the model, I make two adjustments to the framework of Bental and
Demougin (2010) it order to get a better fit to the data. First, I allow for a non-constant user
cost of capital. Second, I analyze a suboptimal adjustment of the bargaining power, as I find
this improves the results even more. Calibrating the model and simulating data for 1980 to
2000 shows that the adjusted model may explain the trends in the data.
For some countries, especially for France, the trends are well represented by the adjusted
model, but the real-world data overshoots the predictions generated by a calibrated version
of the model. To better match the levels, I assume, as a second adjustment to the Bental and
Demougin (2010) approach, that the bargaining power is not distributed optimally, given the
level of monitoring available. Specifically, in the case of France, assuming a biased bargaining
process favoring labor generates results that are closer to the level of the real data. This seems
likely as in the 1980s there was a labor favoring government under Mitterrand. For the US,
the same exercise implies that there is a slight bias in favor of firms. For most other countries
the optimal bargaining power implied by the model generates results that are consistent with
the real-world data with respect to the trends as well as the level of the time series.
For the analysis of monitoring technology on the micro level, I use the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) which has asked the participants how strongly they feel monitored
on a three point scale. This question was asked in five waves between 1985 and 2001 and
therefore covering almost the same time frame as the makro evaluation. The panel structure
of the SOEP allows to distinguish between person specific effects and overall changes in the
sample. I find that the overall average perceived monitoring intensity has increased between
1985 and 2001, while individuals feel less monitored over time. The individual effect can be
explained by career advancement which lead to less monitored positions. These results are
further hints on the reduction of wages due to improvements in the monitoring technology.
In the remainder of this paper, I will first present the model of Bental and Demougin (2010)
with its main results in section two. In section three, I explain the calibration and discuss the
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results of the simulation. Section four shows the empirical assessment on the micro level and
section five concludes.
2 The Model
Bental and Demougin (2010) consider a partial-equilibrium model with a principal-agent
framework. A representative worker is employed by a representative firm. Both firm and
worker are risk-neutral. The firm produces output with capital and labor employing a Cobb-
Douglas technology. Specifically, the production function is of the form
F (e, k) = eνkγ , ν, γ ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where e is the level of effort and k the level of capital per worker.
The worker’s effort is not contractible. Therefore, he is paid via a bonus contract, which
depends on a contractible binary signal s ∈ {0, 1}. The probability of observing a positive
signal, s = 1, increases in the effort of the worker. The better the signal reflects effort, the
lower is the probability of obtaining a bonus for any effort of the worker. The firm is able to
monitor the agent. It is assumed that an advanced monitoring technology is characterized by
its ability to measure effort with a signal more precisely. Thus, given the effort of a worker,
his bonus can be reduced with a higher monitoring precision.
The timing of the model is as follows. First the firm hires capital, then the worker and
the firm are matched and bargain over quasi-rents. Bargaining is modeled as a generalized
Nash Bargaining process, with bargaining power being determined by some institutional rules.
Next, the worker chooses a level of effort, production takes place, and the signal is observed.
Finally, wages are paid.
The problem is solved by backward induction. At the last stage, the worker decides upon
his effort, given the bonus and the level of monitoring. The bonus is determined by the Nash-
Bargaining Solution, assuming that the firms and workers have an outside option of zero. As
the firm hires capital before bargaining, by the time of bargaining, the costs of capital are
sunk. Thus, the firm faces a hold-up situation. Anticipating this, the firm’s incentives to
invest in capital are small, if the bargaining power of the workers is high, since the firm’s
share of the profit is small. On the other hand, under equal circumstances, higher incentives
for the worker lead to higher effort. An optimally chosen bargaining power maximizes net
output as a trade off between effort and capital inputs.
Bental and Demougin (2010) show that the labor share (LS), defined as expected bonus
payments divided by total output, is
LS = (1− α) ν + α, α ∈ [0, 1] (2)
where α is the worker’s bargaining power. As ν is bounded between zero and one, the labor
share increases if α increases.
The capital-output ratio is
4
ky
=
γ (1− α)
r
, (3)
where r is the user cost of capital. It is equal to the interest rate, which Bental and
Demougin (2010) assume to be constant, as the relative price of capital is normalized to
unity.
In order to compare the model’s results with real-world data Bental and Demougin (2010)
translate the production function into a production function with a Harrod-neutral produc-
tivity factor. The resulting efficiency units, (E), can be written in terms of effort
E = e
ν
1−γ . (4)
Thus, the wage per efficiency unit, (W/E), is
W
E
= [(1− α) ν + α]
(
γ (1− α)
r
) γ
1−γ
. (5)
Given equations 2 and 3, this can be written as,
W
E
= LS
(
k
y
) γ
1−γ
. (6)
The last variable to be considered here is the ratio of labor in efficiency units to capital.
E
k
=
(
γ (1− α)
r
)− 1
1−γ
=
(y
k
) 1
1−γ
. (7)
Bental and Demougin (2010) assume that the bargaining power is set by a social planner
who maximizes the sum of the worker’s rent and the firm’s profit. Consequently, the worker’s
bargaining power is a function of the monitoring technology. If the monitoring precision
increases, the worker’s bargaining power decreases and so does the labor share. Additionally,
the capital-to-output ratio increases. Both capital and output increase due to a change in
the monitoring technology. Holding γ and r constant, it is clear that capital increases faster
than output since the bargaining power of the firm increases. Thus, an improved monitoring
precision followed by a shift in bargaining power in favor of the firm, causes a decrease in real
wages relative to efficiency units. Further, as capital increases faster than output, the labor
in efficiency units per capital decreases.
In the following sections I first describe the observable data and then compare the real
world-data to the simulated data.
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3 Macroeconomic Assessment
3.1 Data Description
The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook and ranges from 1980 to 2000.1 Labor
shares were computed as total employment in the business sector times compensation per
worker in the business sector divided by the nominal GDP of the business sector. It is
therefore includes self-employed workers.
I calculate productivity following the standard assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production
function with capital and effective labor.
Yt = K
γ
t (AtLt)
1−γ (8)
This leads to the following definition of efficiency units (productivity)
At =
(
Yt
Kγt L
1−γ
t
) 1
1−γ
, (9)
where At are the efficiency units in period t. Assuming now that the production technology
is constant, γ is set to 0.3.
The time series of the OECD data are shown in figure 1. The top panel shows the labor
shares, the middle panel shows the wages in efficiency units, and the bottom panel shows the
amount of labor in efficiency units over capital.
The OECD-data, demonstrate that the labor share for France, Germany, the United States
and the other countries of consideration has decreased over the last two and a half decades.
In these countries, except for Japan and Spain, real wages relative to productivity have been
decreasing as well in the same period, as can be seen in the second panel of figure 1. The
neoclassical theory would now predict that as wages decrease, effective labor should increase
relative to capital, as it becomes relatively cheaper. This is what has happened in the US and
in Norway. There labor measured in efficiency units relative to capital has increased since
1980. This is shown in the third panels of figure 1. Analogously, effective labor relative to
capital should decrease if wages relative to productivity increase. This is observable for Japan
and Spain.
In France, Australia, Belgium, Italy, and Germany, the wages relative to productivity as
well as the input of labor relative to capital decreased during the last two and a half decades.
As mentioned above, this cannot be explained by the neoclassical approach. However it is
consistent with the model by Bental and Demougin (2010). I show in the following section that
with an extension of this model, not only the trends in France or Germany can be explained,
but also the trends of the US, as well as Norwegian, Japanese or Spanish data.
1I am grateful for being able to use the OECD data set from Bental and Demougin, who in turn received the
data from Olivier Blanchard. See Blanchard (2006) and Bental and Demougin (2010).
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3.2 Specifications of the Simulation
In order to show that the adjusted model can explain the trends I described before, I calibrate
the model of Bental and Demougin (2010) and simulated the time frame from 1980 to 2000. In
figures 2 to 10 the OECD-based data and the data from the simulated time series are presented
within one figure, where the OECD data are represented by the black lines. These figures
allow comparison of the real-world data to the simulated data with respect to trends and
levels in order to decide whether the institutional approach leads to a suitable approximation.
In the simulation I calculate the optimal bargaining power, α, which is a function of the
monitoring technology or precession, θ, the user cost of capital, r, the production function
parameters, ν and γ and the cost of effort of the worker, c. Contrary to Bental and Demougin
(2010), I assume that the user cost of capital is not constant over time. In order to determine
the user cost from the model I use the labor shares equation (2) to compute a preliminary α2.
Choosing an appropriate ν and using the OECD data, I compute for each year the resulting
bargaining power of the worker.3 Taking equation (3), the capital output ratio, it is then
possible to find the user cost as KtYt is also known from OECD-data. I compute the user cost
of capital from
rt = γ (1− αt) Yt
Kt
. (10)
With this approximate rt, which varies across countries and the assumption of an increasing
monitoring precision, I calculate the worker’s optimal bargaining power. The bargaining power
maximizes a social welfare function which equals the sum of the worker’s and the firm’s rent.
The parameters and their values are given in table 1 and 2.
The user costs are determined by the movement of the labor share of the OECD data. The
movement of the bargaining power depends also on the increasing monitoring precision. I
calculated the optimal bargaining power for 20 periods, given the movement in the user costs
between 1980 and 2000 and assuming an increase in the monitoring precision from 0.25 to 0.75
in these periods. With these parameters I simulate the labor share, equation (2), the wages
per efficiency unit, equation (5), and the effective labor input relative to capital, equation (7).
The resulting time series are shown as blue lines in figures 2 to 10.
3.3 Simulation Results
Optimal Bargaining Power
As it can be seen in figures 2 to 10, the trends of the time series can be reproduced with the
simulation. Moreover the trends of data of the US, Norway, Japan and Spain, which do not
follow the Neoclassical prediction, can be explained by this approach.
2There is a tension between the ”empirical” αt generated by equation (2), and the optimal one. Another
approach is to simultaneously generate the optimal αt and rt, and then use the results to compute labor
shares. The latter should be compared to the data. Unfortunately, this is computationally much more
cumbersome within the simulation.
3I used a simple linear approximation of the labor shares between 1980 and 2000. This simplifies the calculation
in the simulation program.
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Parameter Description Values
α worker’s bargaining power endogenous, [0, 1]
θ monitoring precision linearly increasing [0.25, 0.75]
ν Cobb-Douglas parameter4 country specific, see table 2
γ Cobb-Douglas parameter, capital 0.3
r user costs of capital country specific, see table 2
c costs of effort 1.1
Table 1: Calibration of Parameters
Country values for ν resulting values for rt
France 0.6 0.066 - 0.086
Australia 0.45 0.134 - 0.143
Belgium 0.5 0.055 - 0.06
Italy 0.5 0.061 - 0.074
Germany 0.5 0.077 - 0.087
USA 0.6 0.165 - 0.2
Norway 0.4 0.1 - 0.15
Japan 0.6 0.1 - 0.09
Spain 0.5 0.11 - 0.098
Table 2: Choice of ν and rt for calibration
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The graphs for Australia, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and France correspond to the predic-
tions by Bental and Demougin (2010). As the moral-hazard problem weakens due to the
increase in monitoring precision, the wages relative to productivity decrease. Since the hold-
up problem slackens as well, firms invest more and productive labor relative to capital declines.
At the same time the labor share decreases.
Interestingly, when assuming that the user cost of capital is not fixed over time, but adjusts
in the model, the data of the US, Spain, Japan, and Norway are also explainable within the
institutional setup. For the US data and the Norwegian data the wages relative to productivity
decrease and effective labor relative to capital increases. For Japanese and Spanish data the
model suggests, that the capital-output ratio increases faster than the labor share decreases.
Therefore, wages relative to productivity increase and productive labor relative to capital
decreases.
Biased Adjustment of Bargaining Power
Figure 2 shows a gap between the OECD and the simulated data if the bargaining power is
adjusted optimally each period. Reasons for this gap can be found in the political process
and the implementation of the institutions. The social planner does not necessarily give
the same weight to the rents capital owners and workers when maximizing social welfare.
Thus, I simulated the model for France assuming that the bargaining power of labor is biased
towards labor. The dashed and dotted lines in figure 11 show cases where the bargaining
power is determined by a welfare function that poses a higher valuation on the side of labor.
I calculated the labor share, wages per efficiency unit, and the effective labor input relative
to capital using the user cost of capital as in the optimal case, but with the following welfare
function.
maxα W = pi (worker’s rent) + (1− pi) (firm’s rent) (11)
pi represents the weight of the interest group (workers and firms) in the social welfare
function. The egalitarian rule, pi = 0.5, is described in the subsection above. The higher pi is,
the more important is the workers welfare for the social planner or the more favorable are the
bargaining institutions for the worker. These time series are shown as dashed/dotted lines
in the figures for France, figure 11. For the US, figure 12, it is assumed that there is a bias
towards the rent of the firm, implying that pi may be smaller than 0.5.
The graphs show that as the adjustment process becomes more biased the simulated results
get closer to the data. Specifically, the simulation results suggest that the French institutions
induce a bargaining power of the workers which may be higher than expected given current
state of technology and user cost of capital. Under the same assumption, the results for the US
in figure 12 may indicate that institutions give slightly less bargaining power to the workers
than under an optimal determination of bargaining power, since the actual labor share is
below the simulated optimal labor share.
Similar results occur under the assumption of a sluggish adjustment process. In this case
the regulator imposes a bargaining power which was optimal, given the monitoring technology
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N Mean Std. Dev.
Overall 18,748 1.66 0.722
by Occupational Position
Apprentice 993 2.12 0.733
Self-Employed 1,509 1.21 0.511
Manual Laborer 7,514 1.84 0.750
Employee 7,399 1.51 0.644
Civil Servant 1,333 1.64 0.674
by Sector
Manufacturing 3145 1.79 0.760
Service 5151 1.60 0.691
by Year
1985 3,004 1.64 0.736
1987 3,306 1.65 0.737
1989 3,518 1.67 0.733
1995 4,567 1.65 0.707
2001 4,353 1.70 0.706
Table 3: Perceived Monitoring Intensity, Descriptive Statistics
and user cost of capital, five or ten periods before. Here the more lags are included the closer
is the simulated data to the observed data. Both approaches lead to a much better fit in the
levels of the simulation for both the France and the US.
4 Microeconomic Assessment
While it is not possible to simply estimate the parameter model of Bental and Demougin
(2010), due to unobservable variables such as effort, some statistics from micro dataset can
already indicate the relevance of the model. Specifically, I use data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) to analyze monitoring at the workplace. The SOEP is an
annual representative longitudinal micro-database with information on social and economic
outcomes for private households in Germany since 1984. In the years 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995,
and 2001 the SOEP asked the questions: “Is your work strictly monitored?”. The participant
had three answers to choose from: “Completely” (3), “Partly” (2), “Not At All” (1). I use
the information of this question as an indicator for the monitoring intensity at work, which
is on a scale between one and three, where three is the highest level of monitoring intensity.
Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample contains only non-
unemployed workers who are in the labor force. For the five years 18,748 observations are
available and monitoring intensity has a mean of 1.66.
Splitting the sample into occupational positions shows that on average apprentices are
monitored more closely than other occupational groups, while self-employed workers are least
monitored. Monitoring is on average more intense in Manufacturing than in the service
11
Table 4: Changes of Monitoring Intensity over Time
Dependent Variable: Monitoring Intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trend 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.043*** -0.125*** -0.049*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.026)
Tenure 0.001 0.000 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Occ.Position 2 -0.773*** -0.648***
(0.029) (0.049)
Occ.Position 3 -0.184*** -0.292***
(0.026) (0.038)
Occ.Position 4 -0.504*** -0.397***
(0.026) (0.038)
Occ.Position 5 -0.336*** -0.143*
(0.033) (0.076)
Constant 1.639*** 2.149*** 2.156*** 2.222*** 1.697*** 1.878*** 2.055***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.008) (0.038) (0.045)
Fixed Effects X X X
N 18748 18748 18595 18595 18748 18748 18595
R2 0.001 0.038 0.038 0.104 0.002 0.004 0.025
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dummies for Occ.Position: (1) Apprentice, (2) Self-Employed, (3) Manual Laborer,
(4) Employee, (5) Civil Servant.
sector. On an two digit level, industries with a relatively high monitoring intensity and at
least 10 observations are “Manufacturing of Vehicles” with a mean intensity of 1.96 (N=311)
or “Sewage” with a mean intensity of 1.91 (N=22). Low mean monitoring intensities can be
found for the industries “Renting of Machinery”, 1.2 (N=10), or “Research and Development”,
1.31 (N=16). On average the monitoring intensity increases over time.
In the model by Bental and Demougin (2010), increasing monitoring intensity is the driving
force of the changes in the labor share. In order to analyze if there has been indeed a significant
increase in monitoring intensity over time, I regress a time trend and later further controls on
the indicator for monitoring. The results can be found in table 4. The time trend mirrors the
distance of the time periods where the monitoring question is asked, such that the variable
Trend=1, 3, 5, 11, 17. Column one shows the results for a regression with only an intercept
and the trend. The coefficient on trend indicates a significant increase of the monitoring
intensity over time in the pooled sample. Correcting for age and education5 shows an even
stronger positive trend. Including tenure and correcting for the occupational position leaves
the coefficient unchanged.
Columns 4 to 7 show the repeated estimations including person fixed effect. The coefficients
are therefore estimated on the differences of the mean value of the variable by person. If the
time trend is regressed on the monitoring intensity with person fixed effects, the coefficient
5Education is clustered by highest degree into three groups: high (tertiary education), medium (vocational
or general maturity certificate), low (no degree to intermediate general qualification).
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Table 5: Monitoring Intensity and Wages
Dependent Variable: Real Gross Monthly Wage
1 2 3 4 5
Monitoring -127.966*** -67.345*** -49.249*** -17.778** -2.428
(9.441) (10.302) (9.303) (8.654) (13.288)
Education 300.778*** 169.725*** 278.408***
(35.031) (34.491) (73.457)
Tenure 32.809*** 30.075*** 29.521***
(3.221) (3.203) (4.529)
Tenure sqrt -0.853*** -0.653*** -0.754***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.137)
Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Dummies X X X
Occ.Position X X
Industry X
Constant X X X X X
N 18748 18748 18595 18595 9282
r2 0.009 0.003 0.128 0.169 0.230
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
turns negative, indicating a decrease of the monitoring intensity over time. This is also
indicated by the negative and significant coefficients on age and education. It can be expected
that individuals are less intensely monitored if they are more experienced, have worked at the
firm for a longer time, or are older and higher in the hierarchy. I therefore add controls
for education, tenure, and occupational position. Adding all controls leaves the time trend
insignificant and small.
The results from table 4 indicate that on average monitoring intensity increased for people
with the same characteristics on age, education, and occupational positions. On an individual
basis, monitoring intensity decreases throughout the working life, which can be explained by
higher education and changes in job characteristics during the individual career.
A further central hypothesis of Bental and Demougin (2010) is that rents and wages are
reduced when the monitoring precision is increases. Table 5 shows the correlations of the
monitoring intensity and real gross monthly wages. I regress the monitoring intensity and a
constant on the real gross monthly wages and later include further controls which are common
in Mincer type wage regressions (Mincer, 1974). In pooled OLS regression higher wages can
be associated with lower monitoring intensity. Including person fixed effects and therefore
controlling for all individual effects that do not change over the observed time, reduces the
coefficient but leaves it negative and significant. Including education and tenure as a mea-
sure for experience as well as year dummies to account for macroeconomic factors reduces
the correlation again, but it remains significant. The same happens when dummies for the
occupational position are included. Controlling for industry on a two-digit level reduces the
sample size by half and the coefficient of the monitoring intensity is small and insignificant.
The decreasing coefficient of monitoring intensity as controls are included may be explained by
the collinearity of monitoring with occupational and industry characteristics. As the monitor-
ing intensity will be higher in some occupations and industries than it others, the correlation
of monitoring will most likely be taken up in the industry and occupation indicators.
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Table 6: Changes in the Monitoring Intensity
∆ Monitoring Frequency Percent
-2 407 3.52
-1 2,075 17.97
0 6,716 58.16
1 1,995 17.28
2 355 3.07
Total 11,548 100.00
Descriptive statistics for changes in
the monitoring intensity between two
consecutive observation periods by person.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the coefficients in the fixed effects regressions are identi-
fied only through changes from the individual mean. In order to see how many observations
identify the coefficients on monitoring intensity, table 6 shows the amount of changes two
subsequent periods in the monitoring variable. In 58 percent of cases the monitoring intensity
reported by the subjects has not changed compared to the previous observation period. In
about 36 percent of the cases the reported monitoring intensity moved by 1, in 6.5 percent
by 2. In half of all changes a higher monitoring intensity than previously is reported and in
the other half a lower. This also underlines the statement from above, that on an average
individual level monitoring intensity did not increase over time, while the results from above
show that the average monitoring intensity increased over time.
5 Conclusion
Bental and Demougin (2010) introduce a model which explains the downward trend of the
labor share with an ICT induced improvement of monitoring precision which causes the rents
of workers to fall. In this paper, I assess their hypotheses empirically. Their model is consistent
with the downward trend of the labor share, wages relative to productivity, and effective labor
relative to capital in France and other countries like Germany or Austria. I extend their model
by allowing the user cost of capital to change over time. This leads to the conclusion that the
model by Bental and Demougin (2010) is also consistent with the trends in macro economic
US data as well as other countries like Norway, Spain, or Japan. Furthermore, analyzing
German micro-panel data on the perceived monitoring intensity of workers, indicates that
monitoring has indeed increased on average between 1985 and 2001.
The analysis of the impact of ICT on the labor share is closely connected to the analysis
of the impact ICT on changes in the income distribution and on offshoring decisions. A
recent strand of literature analyses how ICT influences the remuneration and relocation of
specific tasks. Autor et al. (2003) introduce the idea that the production can be split into
tasks which are routine and follow clear rules and tasks which non-routine. As the routine
tasks can also be carried out by computers as clear rules are programmable, workers with
routine tasks are substitutes to computers. The “Task”-literature explains decreasing wages
and employment of workers with routine tasks, by the drop in prices of ICT. (Autor et al.,
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2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) analyze the distributional effects that improvements in ICT have
as specific tasks in the production process can be offshored more easily. Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) and Levy and Murnane (2004) underline that the routine tasks, which are
more easily programmable, are also easier to offshore. Next to the fact that routine tasks are
easier to explain to someone abroad they are also easier to monitor. Oldenski (2010) finds
that firms relocate rather routine tasks through foreign direct investments while non-routine
tasks are performed within the firm as communication is more important for these tasks.
It follows from the literature that routine tasks are more easily replaceable by a computer,
they are easier to teach to workers abroad, they are more easily transferable abroad, and they
are easier to monitor. While Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Levy and Murnane
(2004) discuss the characteristic of routine tasks to be easier to monitor, they only mention
improvements of monitoring possibilities through ICT over time in passing.
Schneider (2011) finds a common impact of ICT investments and economic integration as
a main source for a decreasing labor share in European countries. The model by Bental and
Demougin (2010) and my empirical assessment in this paper lead to an additional explanation
of these trends. Not only the easier relocation of production processes through ICT, but also
a reduction in rents through improvements in monitoring technology may be the cause. There
may be two effects of improved monitoring technology on the labor share. In a direct effect,
monitoring precision leads to a reduction in bargaining power and therefore in wages and in
an indirect effect it improves the offshoring possibilities of firms as production process abroad
can be more closely followed and assessed.
Future work should assess the impact of improving monitoring precision on wages for tasks
in contrast to the price effect of decreasing prices on ICT. Furthermore the influence of ICT on
bargaining power and their common impact on the labor share is interesting, but difficult to
study. Common indicators for bargaining power are union coverage or strikes. These are very
indirect measures as the bargaining power of a union may decrease while coverage is fixed.
Stronger indicators for bargaining power would allow to disentangle different influences.
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Figure 2: France: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency Units
over Capital. The black line depicts the real data and the dotted the simulated
approximation.
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Figure 3: USA: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency Units
over Capital. The black line depicts the real data and the dotted the simulated
approximation.
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Figure 4: Australia: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency
Units over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the
simulated data.
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Figure 5: Belgium: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency
Units over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the
simulated data.
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Figure 6: Italy: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency Units
over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the simulated
data.
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Figure 7: Germany: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency
Units over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the
simulated data.
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Figure 8: Norway: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency Units
over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the simulated
data.
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Figure 9: Japan: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency Units
over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the simulated
data.
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Figure 10: Spain: Labor Shares, Real Wages in Efficiency Units and Labor in Efficiency Units
over Capital. The black line depicts the real data, the blue line depicts the simu-
lated data.
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shows the simulation results for pi = 0.6 up to pi = 0.9. The higher the worker’s
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